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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes that memetic theory is a useful lens through which to view trademarks,
particularly as there has been a rise in the number of applications for culturally-driven words and
catchphrases in the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Memetic theory, or memetics, is a
scientific field related to how units of information evolve and replicate. These units of information,
called memes, undergo a process of natural selection comparable to that of genes. To survive as
trademarks, memes must not only exist in the proper form, but they must also subsist in an
environment where replication, variation, and selection exist in appropriate measure. Under current
trademark jurisprudence, over-protection and over-enforcement of trademarks pose a threat to the
natural selection environment. The recent phenomenon of trademark applications for culturally
driven words and catchphrases is but one manifestation of the interaction between memetic theory
and trademark law. Applying memetics to trademark law calls for a reassessment of current legal
standards. This Article concludes by offering further insight into where to explore the intersection
between this incipient science and trademark law.
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MEMETIC THEORY, TRADEMARKS & THE VIRAL MEME MARK
SHONTAVIA JACKSON JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
The race to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has
begun. Should Trayvon Martin’s mother (or anyone else) be able to file trademark
applications for phrases using his name, such as JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON or I AM
TRAYVON?1 If Disney Enterprises, Inc. applies to register SEAL TEAM 6 as a
trademark less than twenty-four hours after Osama bin Laden’s death, should it be
accorded protection?2 And, if protection is proper, should Disney have priority over
the five other applicants seeking to register the same phrase?3 Among thirty
applicants, how many should be awarded trademark protection for a 9/11 victim’s
highly publicized last words, LET’S ROLL?4 Should the USPTO examine trademark
applications for SHOCK AND AWE, the widely- known phrase describing a military
doctrine that the Bush Administration publicly suggested would end the 2003 Iraq
invasion?5 While the USPTO does not keep official statistics on such trademark
applications, it is widely understood that the possibility of exclusive, national rights
in media-amplified words and catchphrases has created a veritable race to the
trademark office among both entrepreneurs and opportunists seeking to harness the
strength of media publicity.6 A number of questions arise in addressing this recent
and increasingly prevalent phenomenon. What makes certain words and phrases
replicate through the masses so quickly, and how can we characterize them? Should
we treat applications for such words and phrases differently from any other
trademark applications in the USPTO? Does trademark law adequately address the
protection of such designations? Should we revisit current trademark standards as
social media, the Internet, and information transmission rapidly change and collide
with the historical underpinnings of the law?
Two phenomena exist at the intersection of our nation’s infatuation with instant
information, social media, and viral7 news: (1) transient fame for the subjects of the
* © Shontavia Jackson Johnson 2013.
Assistant Professor of Law, Drake University Law
School.
1 See infra Part IV.A.4.
2 See infra Part IV.A.3.
3 Id.
4 See infra Part IV.A.1.
5 See infra Part IV.A.2.
6 Tim Newcomb, Q&A: How Can Someone Trademark ‘Occupy Wall Street’?, TIME (Oct. 27,
2011),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/10/27/qa-how-can-someone-trademark-occupy-wall-street.
Cynthia Lynch, the administrator for Trademark Policy & Procedure at the USPTO, has anecdotally
stated in interviews that, “when there is a catchphrase or a quote or something prominent in the
news, in many instances we see one or multiple parties apply for a trademark for it in close
proximity.” Id.
7 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 124 (2007) (suggesting information goes “viral” when it spreads rapidly to a broad
audience through preexisting social networks, the Internet, or other technologies); Kevin Wallsten,
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underlying event8 and (2) words and catchphrases that become inextricably linked to
that event.9 Regarding the former, these subjects generally fade from the public eye
very quickly.10 In contrast, the immediate amplification of words and catchphrases—
through news outlets, social media, and other public forums—occasionally results in
the formation of cultural icons.11 The public and media frequently adopt these words
and catchphrases so significantly that they enjoy much longer temporal presences in
the minds of the public than the singular viral news event.12
This popularity meets the law when federal trademark applications for societydriven words and catchphrases appear immediately after the media and public
popularize the words.13 The applicants may or may not be connected to the
corresponding triggering event and in nearly every instance have neither “created”
the words and catchphrases nor their popularity through the traditional means of
marketing, advertising, or even use.14 Without a timely and thoughtfully attuned
response to this rising phenomenon, trademark protection for such words and
catchphrases could create competition barriers, stifle communication, and ultimately
run afoul of the overarching social function of trademark law.15
Trademark law’s social function acknowledges that trademarks may have dual
meanings—one related to appropriation for specific use in trade and another based
on localized use in the day-to-day lives of individuals.16 Not only do trademarks
provide the commercial benefit of identifying the sources of products, they also have
significant societal and cultural value.17 This social function proposes that society in
“Yes We Can”: How Online Viewership, Blog Discussion, Campaign Statements, and Mainstream
Media Coverage Produced a Viral Video Phenomenon, 7 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 163, 163 (2010)
(describing viral videos as “online video clips that gain widespread popularity when they are passed
from person to person via e-mail, instant messages, and media-sharing Web sites”).
8 See Lili Levi, Content: Social Networks and the Law: Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1531, 1553 (2012) (explaining that “[s]ocial media enable viralization and amplification of
information immediately,” and that “technology and people’s Facebook-influenced sharing norms
mean that the news is more potentially global and certainly more apt to be viral in the world of
tweets and social networking”).
9 See discussion infra Part IV.
10 See Tom Heyden, Harlem Shake:
Tracking a Meme Over a Month, BBC NEWS MAG.,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21624109 (last updated Mar. 1, 2013, 6:25 AM) (discussing
rapid rise and expected downfall of viral video meme).
11 See, e.g., Garance Franke-Ruta, Binders Full of Women: A Meme that Means Something,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 17, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/
binders-full-of-women-a-meme-that-means-something/263740/ (analyzing meaning of “binders full of
women” meme that arose in the 2012 U.S. presidential debate).
12 See Patrick Gavin, “Binders Full of Women” Meme Spreads, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2012, 10:02
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82503.html.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Part IV.
15 See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 828 (describing economic, social and legal
rationales of trademark law). Exploring all of these functions in detail is beyond the narrow scope of
this article, and it is the goal to analyze the broader questions in later work.
16 See generally ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 6–8 (1998) (describing the interplay between the legal
and social aspects of intellectual property law).
17 Id.; Port, supra note 15, at 894.
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its entirety has an interest in using the cultural and expressive facet of some
trademarks.18 However, as safeguards for trademark owners increase (typically
through marketing, advertising, use, and brand loyalty), the space left over for the
societal dimension declines.19
The expansion of trademark protection has
significantly weakened the social function of trademarks, particularly as the value of
trademarks has exploded in recent years.20
Much has been written about the value of trademark protection in the
commercial marketplace.21 Among the factors that may impact the success of a
particular trademark are advertising22 and the consumer’s perception of a product’s
quality, which encompasses “its characteristics, perceived image, and the emotional
connection between the mark and the general public.”23 It is unsurprising, therefore,
that businesses and individuals would seek to ride the waves of viral publicity in
adopting and applying for trademarks. One scholar, Barton Beebe, has termed such
society-driven trademark applications “meme mark” filings, in which opportunists
hurry to appropriate words and catchphrases after their amplification in traditional
or social media.24 Beyond the characterization of such applications as meme mark
filings, however, current trademark scholarship has not yet explored this
phenomenon, although memetics has been used to explore other legal issues.25 As
18

Port, supra note 15, at 895. Professor Port further notes that,
[A]lthough the well settled doctrine states that a trademark holder ought to enjoy
the right of excluding others from using even an iconic trademark to prevent
confusion, mistake, or deception as to the source or origin of the goods or services
on which it uses the trademark, where no confusion is likely, protecting the
trademark holder likely gives the holder a monopoly right in uses of that iconic
mark that should rightfully be shared by all. It should be shared by all, of course,
because society at large played a large role in making it a cultural icon.

Id. Professor Dreyfuss has labeled this kind of trademark use “expressive.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
397, 400–01 (1990).
19 Port, supra note 15, at 894–95; see also Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE
L.J. 1619, 1621 (1999); Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 424; Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman:
The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (1999).
20 Port, supra note 15, at 830.
21 See, e.g., Doris E. Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists at Their Own
Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 127 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (noting that legal
scholars have generally assigned the following values to trademarks: “source designators,
manifestations of goodwill, cultural icons, consumer information signalers, semiotic signifiers, and
competitive regulators”).
22 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 424 (explaining the relationship between advertising
and universal familiarity).
23 Long, supra note 21, at 128 n.20 (citations omitted).
24 Barton Beebe, Trademark:
Today and Tomorrow: Institute for Intellectual Property &
Information Law Symposium: Is the Trademark Office a Rubber Stamp?, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 751, 757
(2011) (referring to meme mark filings as a “curious—and increasingly notorious—phenomenon”).
25 A handful of legal scholars have used memetics to analyze legal issues, most often with
respect to copyright law. See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 347
(2005) [hereinafter Cotter, Memes]; Thomas F. Cotter, Prolegomenon to a Memetic Theory of
Copyright: Comments on Lawrence Lessig’s The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 779, 780 (2003)
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Professor Beebe alludes, memetics (the study of how memes evolve and replicate)
may provide some insight into this new development in the trademark arena.26 This
article builds on Professor Beebe’s observations and develops a full analysis of
memetic theory as a way of deconstructing the adoption, protection, and success of
trademarks.
Memetics is an incipient field of study related to how cultural information
evolves and is transmitted.27 These informational units, called memes, are the
cultural parallel of genes.28 When one person imitates another person, some item
(what we call the “meme”) is passed to that person.29 This meme may be a phrase,
catchy jingle, behavior, or information.30 It can be passed on and imitated many
times.31 Ultimately the meme is no longer controllable by any one individual.32
Memetic theory suggests that memes reproduce and evolve in a manner similar to
genes.33 In the trademark context, memetic theory suggests memes are a critical
component of a trademark’s popularity and success.34 Under this view, marketing
and advertising strategies may be less important in creating a trademark’s brand
awareness than choosing a trademark with strong memes.
This Article, the first to substantively apply memetic theory to trademark law,
will unfold in four parts. Part I of this Article introduces memetic theory and
provides a definitional framework for the term “meme.” It also outlines some of the
basic principles of memetic theory and several criticisms against it. Part II argues
that the words, phrases, and symbols protectable by trademark law can fall within
the definition of the word “meme.” Part III outlines the ways in which trademark
enforcement mechanisms impact memes and can threaten a meme’s evolutionary
ability. Part IV provides a pragmatic approach to USPTO trademark applications for
society-driven words and catchphrases, suggesting that USPTO trademark
examiners assess meme mark applications more stringently. The Article concludes
by suggesting that memetic theory is a useful lens through which to view trademark
[hereinafter Cotter, Prolegomenon]; David A. Simon, Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 279, 313 (2011); Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic
Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 291, 307 (1999); Neal A. Gordon, The Implications of Memetics for the
Cultural Defense, 50 DUKE L.J. 1809, 1812 (2000); Jeffery E. Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A
Memetic Approach to the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213, 1241 (2001).
26 See Beebe, supra note 24, at 757, 757 nn.35 & 36.
27 See RICHARD BRODIE, VIRUS OF THE MIND: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MEME 4–5 (1996).
28 See infra Part I (exploring widespread debate regarding how to define the meme).
See
generally ROBERT AUNGER, THE ELECTRIC MEME: A NEW THEORY OF HOW WE THINK 22–23 (2002)
[hereinafter AUNGER, ELECTRIC MEME]; SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE 4–18, (1999);
BRODIE, supra note 27, at 5–14; DARWINIZING CULTURE: THE STATUS OF MEMETICS AS A SCIENCE
228–29 (Robert Aunger ed., 2000); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (30th anniversary ed.,
2006) [hereinafter DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE]; DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 335–69 (1995); KATE DISTIN, THE SELFISH MEME: A
CRITICAL REASSESSMENT 5–17 (2005); AARON LYNCH, THOUGHT CONTAGION 1–16 (1996).
29 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 4.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. (stating that the meme begins to “take on a life of its own”).
33 Jim Chen, There’s No Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . and It’s a Good Thing Too, 37 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2006); Cotter, Prolegomenon, supra note 25, at 780.
34 See infra Part II.
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law, providing a different perspective and calling for a reassessment of current legal
standards. The conclusion offers additional insight into how the relationship
between memetic theory and trademark law can be further explored.
I. MEMETIC THEORY PRIMER
Memetics is best viewed as a derivative of Charles Darwin’s idea of evolution.
Memetics posits that evolution happens primarily on a genetic—not on an
individual—level.35 Since 1976, when Oxford biologist Richard Dawkins used genetic
evolution as a segue for creating the meme neologism in his book The Selfish Gene,36
biologists, psychologists, philosophers, and scientists have used it to flesh out the
implications of new models of consciousness and thought.37 Discussion of memetic
theory therefore requires consideration not only of memes, but also of Darwinian
theories of evolution and natural selection.
A. Evolution, Natural Selection and the Selfish Gene
Darwin outlined the basic theory of evolution in 1859 in On the Origin of Species
by Means of Natural Selection.38 Before his book, many scientists had studied the
relationships between organisms and contemplated evolution as a general idea, but
no one had decidedly figured out how the process worked as a pragmatic matter.39
Darwin articulated that if living animals differ, and if, due to regular reproduction,
there is a struggle for survival, there is likely some beneficial variation in the
surviving creatures’ inherent biological makeup.40
The creatures with these
beneficial variations would necessarily have the best probability of survival and
create children with the same characteristics.41 This was the principle Darwin called
natural selection—forces of nature must have been driving the selection, not
individual creatures.42
Darwin’s natural selection principle mandates “variation, selection, and
retention (or heredity).”43 Variation must occur so that not all beings are alike.44
Regarding selection, some creatures must survive more successfully in a particular
environment than others.45 Finally, retention requires a method where parents pass
characteristics on to their children.46 If each of these features exist, “then any
See Cotter, Prolegomenon, supra note 25, at 781.
DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28.
37 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 5–11.
38 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (1859).
39BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 10.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.; see also BRODIE, supra note 27, at 49.
43 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 10–11.
44 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 10.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 10–11.
35
36
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characteristics that are positively useful for survival in that environment must tend
to increase.”47
Even while naturalists at the time adopted Darwinian evolution, problems in
their analytical model became apparent. Naturalists casually discussed evolution as
transpiring for the greater good of the species or group, with little or no
contemplation about the precise mechanisms driving the phenomenon.48
One problem was that of exploitation. If, for example, a group of creatures all
act in the best interest of the collective, then one enterprising creature can
effortlessly take advantage of its remaining group mates.49 It could then create
offspring who also exploit the others, which would destroy the former evolutionary
benefit.50 The inverse corollary was also problematic; this difficulty concerned the
levels of benevolence in humans and other creatures, which could reduce an
individual’s personal likelihood of survival.51 A “good of the species” theory could not
explain these behaviors.
Richard Dawkins addressed these issues in The Selfish Gene, in which he
popularized the modern view that, though “evolution may appear to proceed in the
interests of the individual, or for the good of the species, . . . in fact it is all driven by
[genetic competition].”52 In other words, natural selection chooses which genes, and
not which creatures, survive or die.53 This view is called “selfish-gene theory.”54 The
term selfish, as used by Dawkins, means that genes exist only to replicate and be
transferred to offspring.55

Id. at 11.
See generally GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION (1966);
BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 4.
49 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 4.
50 As one scholar has asked:
47
48

On what basis would natural selection lead an organism to sacrifice its own life
for its kin, or to evolve social skills such as trust and cooperation? To be sure,
these traits may improve the group’s probability of surviving and reproducing;
and for a long time, many biologists assumed that natural selection could occur at
the group level and thereby generate selfless behavior on the part of individuals.
But for group selection theories to work, they must overcome a difficult problem:
often, individuals increase their own probability of survival not by acting for the
greater good, but rather by pursuing their own self-interest. An organism that
does not sacrifice itself for a comrade lives to see another day—and will benefit if,
in times of need, it can take a free ride on another comrade’s altruism. Natural
selection, therefore, might seem to suggest that selfish traits will win out over
altruistic traits in the long run, even if altruism would benefit the group to which
the organism belongs.
Id.

See id. at 335–37.
BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 4–5.
53 See Simon, supra note 25, at 287; BRODIE, supra note 27, at 52 (“The pieces of DNA that are
best at causing themselves to get replicated become most numerous, and it is they that participate in
‘survival of the fittest,’ not whole individuals.”).
54 BRODIE, supra note 27, at 51.
55 See id. at 52.
51
52
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In the last chapter of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins pondered whether other “new
replicators” exist that behave like genes.56 In refining Darwin’s natural selection
principle, Dawkins posited that any entity that can make copies of itself will evolve
by natural selection if three conditions are met in appropriate amounts: “longevity,
fecundity, and copying-fidelity.”57 More recently, many scholars have interpreted
Dawkins’ requirements as encompassing replication, variation, and selection.58 First,
replication means that “the entity must reproduce with sufficient fidelity, fecundity,
and longevity to pass on copies of itself to ‘offspring.’”59 Second, variation requires
that the entity sometimes replicate imperfectly, most often through mutation.60 This
may occur either by accident or through deliberate modification.61 For example, an
accidental variation may occur when a person hears a memorable jingle but forgets
some of the words or corresponding music when humming it later.62 On the other
hand, a conscious adaptation occurs in the trademark context when a bungeejumping business is named “Fallmart” after the American retailer Walmart. Third,
selection recognizes that the replicator is competing for residential space in its host’s
brain.63 Some replicators are noticed by a person, remembered, and subsequently
passed on to others, while others do not get noticed or imitated by anyone.64
According to Dawkins, if an entity meets all three requirements, it should also
be considered a selfish replicator capable of evolution by natural selection.65 He
further stated that,
[w]e need a name for [this] new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a
unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a
suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene.’
I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to
meme.66
Though Dawkins did not commit himself to a specific definitional framework for
the term “meme,” he provided as examples: “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes
DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 189–201.
Id. at 194.
58 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 337. Some scholars have suggested different or additional
conditions. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 13 (2002); William
H. Calvin, The Six Essentials? Minimal Requirements for the Darwinian Bootstrapping of Quality, 1
J. MEMETICS 3, Part 4 (1997), available at http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/1997/vol1/calvin_wh.html.
59 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 337. Notably, memes can be shared with others vertically
(generation to generation) or horizontally (person to person). Simon, supra note 25, at 288. Because
memes need not be passed from parent to offspring, this feature in particular has been the subject of
much criticism. Id. at 360–61; see also infra Part I.A.
60 See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 337; Simon, supra note 25, at 287–88.
61 Simon, supra note 25, at 288.
62 See id.
63 See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 337.
64 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 14.
65 DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 200. In this sense, the only purpose of a meme,
like the purpose of a gene, is to replicate itself. See Simon, supra note 25, at 288 (“[H]uman bodies
are merely . . . ‘vehicles’ that memes use to propagate themselves.”) (footnotes omitted).
66 DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 192 (alterations in original).
56
57
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fashions, [or] ways of making pots or of building arches.”67 Without more, the meme
concept was the subject of much probing and criticism. The overarching question
asked, what exactly are scientists to count as falling under the meme umbrella, and
how do we find these memes?68 Several definitions were posited, and the next Section
outlines the competing definitions proposed by meme theorists.
B. Defining the Meme
There are diverse schools of thought on how to define the meme. These schools
essentially fall into broad categories focusing on biological, psychological, or cognitive
processes.69
According to the biological definition, the “meme is [a] basic unit of cultural
transmission, or imitation.”70 This definition is along the lines of Dawkins’ original
proposition and seemingly endorsed by him in later work.71 Under this definition,
“everything we call ‘culture’ is composed of atomlike memes, which compete with one
another.”72 These memes are transferred from brain to brain.73 The winning
memes—those that infiltrate the most minds and go “viral”—are the ones responsible
for creating human culture (i.e., YouTube videos, songs, catch-phrases, etc.).74 The
biological definition is gratifying because it provides a way to reduce all culture into
tangible components that manifest as human behavior, but it does not explain why
replication happens for some, but not all, memes.75 As such, it is useful to consider
other definitions.
The psychological definition, alternatively, explains more than biological, atomlike entities and their behavioral influence.76 Using a psychological approach, the
“meme is the unit of cultural heredity analogous to the gene . . . [and] the internal
67 Id.
Dawkins mentions that scientific ideas, religions, and fashion could fall within the
memetic framework. Id. at 192–93.
68 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 63; Luis Benítez-Bribiesca, Memetics: A Dangerous Idea,
26 INTERCIENCIA 1, 30 (2001).
69 See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 340–43 (discussing various definitional theories and
critiques); Simon, supra note 25, at 354–68 (describing various objections to memetics).
70 BRODIE, supra note 27, at 5; see also RICHARD DAWKINS, THE EXTENDED PHENOTYPE: THE
GENE AS THE UNIT OF SELECTION 109 (1982) [hereinafter DAWKINS, EXTENDED PHENOTYPE].
71 See DAWKINS, EXTENDED PHENOTYPE, supra note 70, at 109–11 (“If the brain stores
information as a pattern of synaptic connections, a meme should in principle be visible under a
microscope as a definite pattern of synaptic structure.”); Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 340.
72 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 5.
73 Id. Many biologists share this view. Juan Delius, for example, has said that memes are
“constellations of activated and non-activated synapses within neural memory networks,” and
“arrays of modified synapses.” Juan D. Delius, Of Mind Memes and Brain Bugs: A Natural History
of Culture, in NATURE OF CULTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY
SYMPOSIUM, OCTOBER 7–11, 45, 53 (Walter A. Koch ed., 1989). Others have theorized that memes
are patterns of information that invade the human mind and are replicated by others. See, e.g.,
Glenn Grant, Memetic Lexicon, PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA WEB (last visited Aug. 31, 2013)
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/MEMLEX.html.
74 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 5–6.
75 Id. at 6.
76 Id.
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representation of knowledge” residing in the mind.77 This definition focuses on the
similarity between memes and genes.78 It notes that, just as genes create various
physical effects (i.e., hair texture, gender or height), the memes residing in the brain
can impact human conduct.79 This approach, according to some, equates the human
brain to a computer: if “memes are the software part of your programming[,] the
brain and central nervous system, produced by . . . genes, are the hardware part.”80
This way of looking at memes is helpful because it explains how human beings
operate, but it is also incomplete because it centers solely on the brain without
considering environmental effects.81
Conversely, the cognitive definition completely removes the human brain, and
the human itself, from the analysis. This definition, proffered by scientist and
philosopher Daniel Dennett, provides that the meme is a type of “complex idea that
forms itself into a distinct memorable unit,”82 the smallest of which “replicate
themselves with reliability and fecundity.”83 Using this approach, memes spread,84
“propagat[ing] themselves from brain to brain, from brain to book, from book to
brain, from brain to computer, [or] from computer to computer.”85 As explained by
Dennett’s analogy, “[a] wagon with spoked wheels carries not only grain or freight
from place to place; it carries the brilliant idea of a wagon with spoked wheels from
mind to mind.”86 Memes under this approach, therefore, are “‘substrate neutral’,
capable of existing in, and spreading” among brains, behavior, and objects.87 For
example, say the first person whose brain transported the “spoked wheel meme”
builds one spoke-wheeled wagon.88 Others will see this first wagon, replicate the
same meme, and continue to build more wagons until there exist hundreds,
thousands, or millions of wagons with spoked wheels.89 The cognitive definition,
therefore, views memes as operating systems of the brain that produce tangible
results “in the physical world that then carry their own seeds to other[s].”90
All of the aforementioned definitions offer desirable qualities. The biological
definition provides a fundamental explanation of memes using a familiar sperm-andegg type framework,91 the psychological definition provides a lens into the inner-

77 Id. At least one legal scholar has seemingly endorsed this view. See Simon, supra note 25,
at 289 (“One helpful way to think about memes is as little organisms with which we have a mostly
mutualistic symbiotic relationship.”).
78 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 6.
79 Id. at 6–7.
80 Id. at 7.
81 See, e.g., id. at 8.
82 Id.
83 DENNETT, supra note 28, at 344.
84 BRODIE, supra note 27, at 9.
85 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION REVEALS
A UNIVERSE WITHOUT DESIGN 225 (1986).
86 BRODIE, supra note 27, at 9.
87 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 340.
88 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 9.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 5.
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workings of the human brain,92 and the cognitive definition tracks how memes
replicate as they travel from substrate to substrate. The cognitive definition, the
broadest approach to memes, provides the simplest manner in which to think about
them.93 Because memetic theory is still in its early stages, a broad definitional
structure provides the most leeway for later terminology and exceptions as they
become identified.94 Consequently, this article uses the word meme as other scholars
have: “indiscriminately to refer to memetic information in any of its many forms;
including ideas, the brain structures that instantiate those ideas, the behaviours
these brain structures produce, and their versions in books, recipes, maps and
written music.”95
C. Basic Memetic Theory Principles
At bottom, memetics is a scientific methodology in which memes are distinct
units competing for space in our brains, behaviors, and cultural artifacts and fighting
for replicatory advantages.96 In memetic terms, all culture is created by replication.97
The memes that succeed through widespread imitation have best evolved for
replication and communication.98 When that meme releases subsequent replicators,
it begins “to ‘have a life of [its] own.’”99 As noted by memetics scholar Richard Brodie:
Some memes spread directly from mind to mind. Yelling “Fire!” in a
crowded theater does a great job of spreading that meme from mind to mind
quickly. Some spread more indirectly. A mother, not wanting to perpetuate
the unhappy experience she had when her mother raised her with iron
discipline, may react by raising her daughter with a very loose rein—a
meme from the opposite child-rearing strategy. The granddaughter, in
turn, may react to her unhappy experience of the loose rein by resuming
Grandmother’s iron hand.
The iron hand meme got transmitted
indirectly.100

Id. at 6.
See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 66.
94 Simon M. Reader & Kevin N. Laland, Do Animals Have Memes?, 3 J. MEMETICS 100, Part 2
(1999), available at http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/1999/vol3/reader_sm&laland_kn.html. Though this
article limits its analysis to humans, memetics could arguably reach many different species. See
David L. Hull, Taking Memetics Seriously: Memetics Will Be What We Make It, in DARWINIZING
CULTURE: THE STATUS OF MEMETICS AS A SCIENCE, supra note 28, at 45–46.
95 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 66 (noting that “[a]s long as that information can be copied by
a process we may broadly call ‘imitation’, then it counts as a meme”).
96 See Simon, supra note 25, at 283.
97 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 29 (“The emotions, the intellectual struggles, the subjective
experiences—these are all parts of the complex system that leads to some behaviours being imitated
and others not.”).
98 See Fried, supra note 25, at 298.
99 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 29.
100 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 15.
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Memes, therefore, can spread relatively easily, or they can spread chaotically
through a series of cause and effect events.101 To be successful, however, memes
must replicate—this is ultimately their only function.102
What causes one meme to replicate more successfully than another? Some
theorize that memes cultivate characteristics called “Good Tricks” to provide some
memes with advantages over other memes competing for limited space, including: (1)
being “genuinely useful to a human host”; (2) being “easily imitated by human
brains”; (3) “chang[ing] the selective environment to the detriment of competing
memes”; or (4) “answer[ing] questions that the human brain finds of interest.”103
Not every thing or idea, however, is a meme.104 Some ideas exist in the mind as
basic human thoughts, but these ideas do not travel or escape because they do not
include means for escape or copying.105 Most meme theorists would probably not
refer to these thoughts as memes, as it is fundamentally impossible for them to
replicate or subsequently be transferred.106
Information and ideas that are memes will succeed as long as they replicate
well, whether or not they are good ideas, precise, politically correct, or helpful to the
host.107 Memes that make factual claims are not factual, accurate, or true just
because they successfully spread to others.108 In addition, “the success of musical or
artistic memes will not necessarily be proportional to their aesthetic merit, and the
fecundity of memes for behaviors does not necessarily correlate with their benefit for
the people so behaving, or for society at large.”109 Common examples of successful,
yet harmful, memes include Nazism, suicide bombing, airline hijacking, and
computer viruses.110 These replicators get copied as long as they have the equipment
needed for copying.111 Logically, however, if a meme is so harmful that an individual
can no longer share it with others, it should be “eliminated from the meme-pool.”112
Nonetheless, meme success will not inevitably correlate with benefits to the holder.113
It is also important to note that memes are not always isolated, individual
entities; groups of memes can join and replicate together.114 Dawkins referred to

Id.
See, e.g., Simon, supra note 25, at 289 (“[M]emes are just replicators . . . . They do this in
the same way genes use human beings . . . to replicate themselves. Genes do not ‘want’ anything
other than to make more copies of themselves.”).
103 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 338–39, 345 (footnotes omitted).
104 Stake, supra note 25, at 1225.
105 Id. at 1225 n.30 (citing STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT:
HOW THE MIND
CREATES LANGUAGE 55–82 (1994)) (discussing ideas trapped in the mind, incapable of translation
into a intelligible form of expression).
106 Id. at 1225.
107 Fried, supra note 25, at 298; see also Stake, supra note 25, at 1239–40.
108 Fried, supra note 25, at 298.
109 Id. at 298–99.
110 See BRODIE, supra note 27, at 15, 36; Dennett, supra note 28, at 363.
111 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 13.
112 DAWKINS, EXTENDED PHENOTYPE, supra note 70, at 110.
113 See Simon, supra note 25, at 292 (“The meme of suicide bombing is clearly bad for the host,
who dies. But the meme does not die along with the host. To the contrary, others may celebrate (or
condemn) the meme, which will be further perpetuated and probably endorsed by other hosts.”).
114 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 19; Simon, supra note 25, at 290.
101
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these as “coadapted meme complexes,” but the phrase is often shortened as
“memeplexes.”115 Within these groups, some memes may be stronger and more
successful at replication than others, and the memeplex may be selected because of
some memes, but not others.116 The quintessential example offered by meme
theorists is that of the computer virus.117 Computer viruses can replicate from one
machine to another very quickly, but they cannot stand alone as empty “copy me”
messages—they may ruin the first computer, but they have no way to get out of the
infected machine without attaching to something else.118 Oftentimes, these viruses
are attached to other memes to insure their replication, for example, through an
email from a recognized sender or by hiding in the code of an often-visited website.119
Another example is the chain letter, which operates with a two-pronged memeplex: a
promised-threat meme for noncompliance and a promised-reward meme for
compliance.120 The chain letter memeplex forces replication by declaring that a
person’s well-being depends on her forwarding or sharing it with others.121
D. Criticisms of Memetic Theory
Memetic theory has, predictably, been the subject of significant criticism from
the scientific community.122
In addition to the aforementioned definitional
approaches, there has been much disagreement regarding mutation instability, the
characterization of memetics as Darwinian as opposed to Lamarckian,123 and the
relative size and scope of the meme.124 This section outlines these criticisms and
responses from meme theorists.
115 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 19 (comparing meme groups to gene groups and noting that
“a free-floating piece of DNA could not effectively get itself replicated” without groups of genes).
116 Simon, supra note 25, at 290 (citing Derek Gatherer, Macromemetics: Toward a Framework
for the Re-unification of Philosophy, 1 J. MEMETICS 1, § 3 (1997), available at http://cfpm.org/jomemit/1997/vol1/gatherer_dg.html (comparing memeplexes to “pork barrel” legislation, in which
smaller legislation “is attached . . . to large, complex bills to avoid being selected against”)).
117 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 20.
118 See id.; BRODIE, supra note 27, at 42.
119 See, e.g., Frank Thorsberg, The World’s Worst Viruses, PCWORLD (Aug. 23, 2002, 1:00 AM),
www.pcworld.com/article/103992/article.html (naming “LoveLetter,” a virus that impacted millions
of Widows PCs, as the worst computer virus to date). Customers were “infected via e-mail, through
Internet chat systems, and through other shared file systems.” Id. Once the virus accessed a
computer’s email program, it sent out copies of itself to all contacts listed in the address book. Id.
The infectious messages the mysterious subject line, “ILOVEYOU.” Id.
120 See Charles H. Bennett et al., Chain Letters & Evolutionary Histories, SCI. AM., June 2003,
at 76–81, available at http://clair.si.umich.edu/si767/papers/Week12/msa/Bennett.pdf; Fried, supra
note 25, at 300.
121 Fried, supra note 25, at 300.
122 See, e.g., Benítez-Bribiesca, supra note 68, at 31. Dr. Benítez-Bribiesca, for example, has
called memetics “pseudoscientific dogma encased in itself” and “something akin to psychoanalysis
with its wonderful intellectual construction but devoid of any objective proof.” Id.
123 See Simon, supra note 25, at 360–62 (discussing the now-discredited theory of evolution
created by the French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck); ALPHEUS S. PACKARD, LAMARCK: THE
FOUNDER OF EVOLUTION: HIS LIFE AND WORK 357–71 (1901).
124 See infra notes 138–147 and accompanying text.
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One of the most common criticisms to memetics is that memes are not stable
enough to be likened to genes. Some argue that memes lack a “code script” similar to
the function that DNA performs for genes, which arguably leads to imprecise copying
and high mutation rates.125 According to some critics, memes cannot possibly
replicate themselves with the degree of accuracy of genetic evolution.126 Without a
structural counterpart similar to DNA, critics argue that effective variation cannot
occur because the meme lacks a “precise copying mechanism.”127 Many scholars liken
this to the childhood game “Telephone,” where one person whispers a sentence, or
series of sentences, in the ear of another, who then whispers it in the ear of another,
until all participants have received the whispered message in a sequential manner.128
In nearly every case, the final sentence bears little to no resemblance to the original.
This is problematic because, as earlier noted, natural selection can only occur in
memes if they reproduce with sufficient fidelity to pass on copies of themselves to
offspring.129
Memeticists have responded to this criticism by arguing that information is
often transmitted with enough accuracy for there to exist “some degree of natural
selection.”130 In addition, some scholars have distinguished grammatical form from
linguistic properties:
[o]ne of the most striking features of cultural evolution is the ease,
reliability, and confidence with which we can identify commonalities in
spite of the vast differences in underlying media. What do Romeo and
Juliet and . . . West Side Story have in common? Not a string of English
characters, not even a sequence of propositions (in English or French or
German . . . translation). What is in common, of course, is not a syntactic
property or system of properties but a semantic property or system of
properties: the story, not the text; the characters and their personalities,
not their names and speeches. What we so readily identify as the same
thing in both cases is the predicament that both William Shakespeare and
Arthur Laurents (who wrote the book for West Side Story) want us to think
about. So it is only at the level of intentional objects, once we have adopted
the intentional stance, that we can describe these common properties.
When we do adopt the stance, the sought-for common features often stick
out like sore thumbs.131

See, e.g., Benítez-Bribiesca, supra note 68, at 30.
See id. at 30–31; Robert Aunger, Conclusion, in DARWINIZING CULTURE, supra note 28, at
228–29 (further exploring distinction between genetic and “cultural” evolution).
127 Benítez-Bribiesca, supra note 68, at 30 (citation omitted) (“Information in genes is encoded
in digital form with four letters, but in memes messages are encoded in continuously varying
analogous symbols that might rapidly decay into noise as they are transmitted from individual to
individual.”).
128 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 342 (footnotes omitted).
129 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
130 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 343 (emphasis added).
131 DENNETT, supra note 28, at 356 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
125
126

[13:96 2013]The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property LawThe John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

110

Another response, based on the biological definition of memes, theorizes that
memes are physical entities, like genes, that have not yet had the seminal “Watson
and Crick” discovery that genes had in 1953.132
A second criticism is that memetics is based on the now-discredited Lamarckian
theory of evolution and not Darwinism. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck hypothesized that
animals not only inherit characteristics through the egg and sperm, but that they can
inherit traits that their parents developed in life.133 So, for example, Lamarck
believed that an assiduous basketball player who diligently practiced dribbling a
basketball could pass down his dribbling skills to his offspring. Darwin’s departure
from this philosophy is what saved evolution from scientific disrepute—“acquired
traits cannot be inherited” as Lamarck; only those characteristics possessed at birth
can be inherited by offspring.134 Several scholars have noted that the differences
between genes and memes become most clear with respect to claims of
Lamarckianism.135 When a gene is passed to a child, it is generally accomplished by
sexual reproduction through the parents; an occasion will not arise for the gene to be
subsequently passed to another person.136 Memes, however, reproduce by imitation,
not via sperm and egg, and there are no scientific reasons that replication differences
preclude Darwinian-type evolution.137
One final criticism exists because there is no clear consensus on the requisite
size of the meme.138 In her seminal text, prominent memetic scientist Susan
Blackmore conceded that the meme’s size and structure may be impossible to
identify, she but further noted that the genetic unit is similarly unclear among
scientists.139 Dawkins similarly explained that:
[t]o define a gene as a single cistron is good for some purposes, but for the
purposes of evolutionary theory it needs to be enlarged. . . . We want to find
the practical unit of natural selection. To do this we begin by identifying
the properties that a successful unit of natural selection must
have. . . . [T]hese are longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity. We then

132 See AUNGER, ELECTRIC MEME, supra note 28, at 275; Simon, supra note 25, at 356–57.
James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the double-helix structure of DNA in 1953. Leslie A.
Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and Crick, 1 NATURE EDUC. (2008),
available
at
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/discovery-of-dna-structure-and-functionwatson-397.
133 See Simon, supra note 25, at 360 (citing Packard, supra note 123, at 357–71).
134 Id. at 361.
135 See id.; BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 59–62.
136 Simon, supra note 25, at 361.
137 Id.
138 See Benítez-Bribiesca, supra note 68, at 30; Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 350; Simon,
supra note 25, at 354–55.
139 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 53–56. Blackmore further observed that the appropriate
measurement of a gene changes with “relevant selection pressures” and differs between scientists
interested in different things. Id. at 54; see also DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 195
(noting that the gene is “defined, not in a rigid all-or-none way, but as a unit of convenience, a
length of chromosome with just sufficient copying-fidelity to serve as a viable unit of natural
selection”).
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simply define a ‘gene’ as the largest entity which, at least potentially, has
these properties.140
In asking “how long is ‘long enough’?” with respect to meme size, Dawkins noted
that the answer will vary from example to example.141 Similar inherent fluidities,
however, about what should be considered a gene have not hindered scientific
advancement in the relevant fields.142 The best approach, therefore, is to apply the
same logic to memetics and apply a fluid, but pragmatic, sizing structure to the
meme.
Some scholars have attempted to do this very thing. Dennett, for example, has
defined units of memes as “the smallest elements that replicate themselves with
reliability and fecundity.”143 Dawkins has explained that a “single phrase of
Beethoven’s ninth symphony” is the equivalent of one meme.144 Blackmore has
further suggested that:
[a] blob of pink paint is too small a unit for memetic selection pressures to
apply—to be enjoyed or disliked, photographed or thrown away. A whole
gallery of paintings is too large. The single painting is the natural unit for
most of us and that is why we remember Van Gogh’s Sunflowers or buy
postcards of Edvard Munch’s The Scream. Styles of paintings, such as
impressionism or cubism, can also be copied and therefore count as memes,
but can hardly be divided up into units.145
Finally, several scholars have proposed that a single word can function as a
meme.146 Meme size and scope, therefore, is not a “rigid all-or-none way,” but “a unit
of convenience . . . with just sufficient copying-fidelity to serve as a viable unit of
natural selection.”147 It is therefore wrong to suggest that memetics cannot or should
not exist because of variations in meme size or structure.
Assuming that memes do actually exist, and that memetics remains acceptable
scientific theory, how can memetics inform an analysis of trademark law, and what is
the benefit in doing so? Memetic theory may offer some explanation for why certain
trademarks are copied more than others.148 Likewise, memetics has the capacity to
describe what causes human beings to replicate and transmit some trademarks but
DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 35.
Id. at 36.
142 See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 54; Hull, supra note 94 at 46–47 (noting that even
geneticists have not used the word “gene” consistently); Helen Pearson, Genetics: What Is a Gene?,
441 NATURE 398, 398 (May 25, 2006) (noting that scientists are “less . . . sure about what, if
anything, a gene actually is”).
143 DENNETT, supra note 28, at 344.
144 DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 195. Indeed, the distinctive “ta-ta-ta-TUM”
from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, is an oft-used example of a meme. BRODIE, supra note 27, at 12;
see also BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 53.
145 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 54.
146 Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 351.
147 DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 195.
148 See Cotter, Prolegomenon, supra note 25, at 782–83 (offering a memetic explanation for the
spread of religious doctrines).
140
141
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not others.149 If a trademark can be a meme on its own, or attach to a popular
memeplex, memetics could significantly impact the adoption and success of
trademarks and the way in which companies build and implement their brands.
Trademarks are the critical way in which companies communicate with the buying
public.150 Their power to generate brand loyalty makes them important in the
competition for consumer attention and ultimately consumer dollars.151 In addition,
if strong memes, and not the putative trademark owner’s own efforts, have
propagated the strength and distinctiveness of a trademark, the USPTO should
consider this when assessing trademark applications. As argued below, because
memetic theory gives those who understand it the opportunity to better influence the
spread of memes, it can provide a useful way for thinking about how trademarks
exist and thrive in the commercial marketplace.152 It can also provide a basis for
preventing the immediate privatization of certain culturally driven marks and
catchphrases.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF TRADEMARK LAW AND MEMETIC THEORY
Given that the term “meme” may refer to memetic information in an allencompassing manner,153 it is conceivable that trademarks could fall within the
term’s scope. Dawkins initially identified tunes and catchphrases as two examples of
memes,154 and other scholars have suggested that single words can be memes.155 The
Lanham Act defines trademarks as designations including “any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof.”156 There is, thus, overlap between the basic
definitions of memes and trademarks.
Proceeding on this basis, this Part outlines some of the myriad issues that arise
in viewing trademarks through the lens of memetic theory. In considering whether a
trademark is also a meme, three conditions must exist. First, the trademark must
exist in a form recognizable as coming under the meme umbrella. Second, the
trademark must be a selfish replicator. Finally, even if a trademarked designation
meets the functional memetic requirements, trademark enforcement mechanisms
may stifle, or even eliminate, replication in such a way that true natural selection is
not possible.

See BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 14.
See Long, supra note 21, at 133–34.
151 See id. at 133–35.
152 See infra Part II.B.
153 BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 66. The term meme “include[es] ideas, the brain structures
that instantiate those ideas, the behaviours these brain structures produce, and their versions in
books, recipes, maps and written music,” as long as that information can be imitated. Id.
154 DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 192.
155 See, e.g., Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 350.
156 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
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A. Trademarks in an Acceptable Memetic Form
The term trademark has multiple meanings—it can describe an entire range of
“trademarks, service marks, trade names, certification and collective marks, and
trade dress,” or it can refer only to words and symbols used to identify products.157 In
the interest of efficiency, this Article focuses on designations like words, names,
symbols and devices, and their function in (1) identifying and distinguishing goods
from those manufactured or sold by others and (2) indicating the source of the
goods.158 These designations are protectable by trademark law when they are
adopted, used in trade, and distinctive, either inherently or through the acquisition
of secondary meaning.159 Since the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has
recognized as a general proposition that “the exclusive right to the use of the mark or
device claimed as a trade-mark is founded on priority of appropriation; . . . the
claimant of the trade-mark must have been the first to use or employ the same on
like articles of production.”160 Generally, therefore, only actual use as a trademark,
and not USPTO registration, creates rights in such designations. The only exception
is that since 1989, a party can file a trademark application based on that party’s
intent to use the mark in commerce, even if that party has not yet used the mark on
anything.161
With respect to distinctiveness, the general rule is that a designation is
protectable as a trademark if it falls into one of two categories. First, some
trademarks are so inherently distinct that legal protection is granted “immediately
upon adoption and use in trade.”162 This category of trademarks includes fanciful,
arbitrary, and suggestive marks.163 A fanciful mark is a word that is created for the
purpose of operating as a source indicator and can include terms unfamiliar to
consumers.164 An arbitrary mark, on the other hand, consists of a designation that is
part of the public lexicon but applied to the goods in a manner unrelated to its
traditional meaning.165 Marks are suggestive “if [they require] imagination, thought
and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”166

157 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:19
(4th ed. 2004).
158 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The reflections in this Article, however, could apply to the entire range,
including service marks, trade names, certification and collective marks, and trade dress.
MCCARTHY, supra note 157 § 4:19.
159 See id. (requiring use in commerce); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
767–70 (1992) (explaining alternative requirements of inherent and acquired distinctiveness).
160 Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1893) (emphasis added).
161 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Even when an “intent-to-use” application is filed, registration will not
issue until the applicant confirms actual use. See Amy B. Cohen, Intent to Use: A Failed
Experiment?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 683, 692–93; see also Port, supra note 15, at 835–36.
162 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 16:4.
163 Id.; Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768–69.
164 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 11:4; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456,
462 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding PROZAC for anti-depressant fanciful); Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp.
2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding VIAGRA for erectile dysfunction drug fanciful).
165 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 11:4; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314
F.2d 149, 153–54 (9th Cir. 1963) (finding BLACK & WHITE for scotch whiskey arbitrary); Hanover
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Descriptive marks are neither inherently distinctive nor automatically
protectable. These marks are only protectable as trademarks if they have acquired
secondary meaning.167
Though nearly every jurisdiction interprets secondary
meaning differently, the crux of the doctrine “is a mental association in buyers’ minds
between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.”168
In all of this, it is worth noting that the term “trademark” has been interpreted
quite broadly. Under an increasingly expansive approach to trademark law, a
trademark can include not only a word mark such as KODAK or McDONALD’S, but
also things like the Coca-Cola bottle design,169 the vertical opening motion of
Lamborghini’s car doors,170 Christian Louboutin’s contrasting red outsole on women’s
shoes,171 or the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) lion’s roar.172
Using the earlier-adopted cognitive approach, which provides that a meme is the
smallest unit of culture that can be reliably copied, a trademark designation can also
be a meme. Size (including length), “independent memorizable meaning,” and
cultural beliefs of the audience are significant factors in determining whether
trademarks fall within the cognitive definition of a meme.173 Thus, even a short
musical sequence can be a meme if it is culturally significant to the listener.174
Indeed, if one hears “twinkle, twinkle, little star,” that person may continue humming
“how I wonder what you are” because of an independent, memorizable meaning from
childhood.175

Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1913), aff’d, 240 U.S. 403 (1916)
(discussing arbitrary marks).
166 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11; see also MCCARTHY, supra
note 157 § 11:62; Sinhdarella, Inc. v. Vu, No. C 07-04353 WHA, 2008 WL 410246, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2008) (finding BOILING CRAB for seafood restaurants suggestive); Louis Rich, Inc. v.
Horace W. Longacre, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1327, 1337–38 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding GOBBLE-GOBBLE
for processed turkey meat suggestive).
167 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). The Lanham Act uses
the phrase “acquired distinctiveness,” while the term “secondary meaning” was created by the
common law. MCCARTHY, supra note 157, at § 15:1 (footnotes omitted).
168 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 15:5 (outlining some of the varied approaches to secondary
meaning).
169 U.S. Trademark No. 2,085,197 (filed Dec. 15, 1994) (Coca-Cola Bottle Shape).
170 U.S. Trademark No. 2,793,439 (filed Dec. 28, 1999) (Lamborghini door opening).
171 U.S. Trademark No. 3,361,597 (filed Mar. 27, 2007) (Louboutin red sole); see also Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2012).
172 U.S. Trademark No. 1,395,550 (filed Aug. 15, 1985) [hereinafter No. ‘550] (MGM lion’s roar).
173 See, e.g., J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 47 (1998).
174 Id. On the other hand, some scholars have been hesitant to include such small elements in
the definition of memes. See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 28, at 344. In the intellectual property
arena, arguments against including individual words and short phrases in the definition of a meme
have been made in relation to copyright law. According to Professor Cotter, this has largely been
because a definition that is “too particulate will have no implications for copyright law,
because . . . copyright does not subsist in individual words or letters or short phrases.” See Cotter,
Memes, supra note 25, at 350. Even so, Cotter noted that he was “not sure if there is any reason to
exclude such tiny elements from the definition of the meme.” Id. at 350.
175 See BALKIN, supra note 173, at 47; BLACKMORE, supra note 28, at 7 (discussing the song
Happy Birthday to You).
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The ultimate function of a trademark is to cause a consumer to mentally
associate a particular product with that mark.176 This legal premise largely comports
with the aforementioned meme factors of length, memorability, and cultural
expectations, and these factors support the notion that a trademark can also be a
meme.
Turning to some of the earlier examples, McDONALD’S is one word made of
nine letters and is relatively short as far as memes are considered.177 However,
through years of use, marketing, advertising, consumer loyalty, and service, it has
become a memorable phrase identifying the world’s largest chain of fast-food
restaurants. Turning to cultural expectations, it is difficult to deny the impact that
the company, using the trademark McDONALD’S, has had on socioeconomics, the
free market, and the food industry.178 Using a memetic theory analysis, therefore,
the trademark McDONALD’S could fall within the definition of meme, although its
status as such would depend upon whether it also meets Dawkins’s three conditions
of replication, variation, and selection.179
Memetic theory can also apply to non-traditional trademarks other than words
and phrases, such as the MGM lion’s roar.180 Though it only has a 7.5 second
duration, arguments can certainly be made that it is memorable and culturally
significant to the listener. The roar was first used in 1924, has appeared consistently
in openings and closings of MGM films, and is widely recognized by American movie
audiences.181 Based on these two examples, even shorter-length trademarks can be
considered appropriate for purposes of memetic analysis. The ultimate status as a
meme, however, will turn on a trademark’s ability to function as a selfish replicator.
B. Trademarks as Selfish Replicators
As identified earlier, Dawkins posited that any entity that can make copies of
itself will evolve by natural selection if replication, variation, and selection

See MCCARTHY, supra note 157 § 3:6.
But see Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 350 (stating that “there is a good pragmatic reason
not to define single words, letters, or notes of the musical scale as memes”).
178 See, e.g., JOE L. KINCHELOE, THE SIGN OF THE BURGER: MCDONALD’S AND THE CULTURE OF
POWER 2 (2002) (citation omitted) (noting that some “identify [MCDONALD’S] as the most important
signifier around the world for free market capitalism”).
179 See supra Section I.B.
180 Case R-781/1999-4, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion Corp., 2004 E.T.M.R. 34 (CTM No. 143891),
¶ 9 (Aug. 25, 2003). MGM has more particularly described its trademark in the European
Trademark Office as “the sound of a roaring lion having a 7.5 second duration (abscissa) with a
frequency response from 25 Hz to 12.5 Hz with measurable harmonies to 20 Kz (y-axis). It has peak
modulation at 0.5 second and 4 seconds from the start of the lion’s roars and attendant growls’.” Id.
Though MGM first used the mark in 1924, the trademark application was not filed until August 15,
1985, and it ultimately registered on June 3, 1986. See No. ‘550, supra note 172.
181 See About MGM, MGM, http://www.mgm.com/#/about/mgm-history (last visited Aug. 31,
2013).
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appropriately exist.182 The overarching question, then, is whether a trademark has
the capacity to replicate and evolve under this three-part standard.
Replication requires that a trademark have the capacity to create copies of itself
with sufficient fecundity, fidelity, and longevity to pass those replicas on to others.183
Under a cognitive definition, this could take place from one person to another,
written materials to consumer, or computer to user. Replication can arise in a
number of contexts, including marketing, consumer-to-consumer interactions, and
trademark infringement. Returning to the earlier examples, the McDONALD’S
trademark (or meme) can be created and copied many times over when one Twitter
user tweets about her pleasant experience in the fast food restaurant to her many
followers, some of whom retweet184 the original user’s message to their many
followers. Similarly with MGM’s lion’s roar, one recent search on YouTube for “MGM
lion roar” returned over 5000 results.185 Of the videos posted, a number of them
included exact reproductions of the lion’s roar from past MGM films.186 Replication
also arises when an alleged infringer copies the trademark for similar or different
categories of goods. This may be in exact form (i.e., a person naming their restaurant
“McDonald’s Hamburgers: Country Drive-Inn”) or as a variation (i.e., a group of
dentists naming their dental practice McDENTAL).187
Variation, as a separate condition, requires that the trademark occasionally
replicate imperfectly, usually by accident or through “conscious adaptation.”188 This
is perhaps the most difficult barrier in defining the relationship between trademarks
and memetic theory. The use requirement in trademark law has a physical
dimension, and both the USPTO and courts weigh heavily the consistency of such use
in determining whether to accord legal protection to a possible trademark.189 A
trademark need not be “particularly large in size or . . . appear in any particular
position on the goods, but it must be used in such a manner that its nature and
function are readily apparent and recognizable without extended analysis or research
and certainly without legal opinion.”190 In one example, a court denied trademark
protection for the term INTELLIGENCE EVERYWHERE because the putative

182 See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text; DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at
189–201.
183 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
184 Twitter
Glossary, TWITTER.COM, https://support.twitter.com/entries/166337-the-twitterglossary#r (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (defining a retweet as a “[t]weet by another user, forwarded to
you by someone you follow [and] [o]ften used to spread news or share valuable findings on Twitter”).
185 YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com (type “mgm lion roar” in search field at the top of
the page) (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
186 See id. (including the lion’s roar from films released in 1928, 1934, 1982, and 2008).
187 Both of these instances resulted in lawsuits in which McDonald’s successfully forced the
businesses to change their names. See Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
201 (D. Md. 1988); McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135
(N.D.N.Y. 1993).
188 Simon, supra note 25, at 288.
189 See MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing
Textron Inc. v. Cardinal Eng’g Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 397, 399 (T.T.A.B. 1969)) (holding mark
protectable where it had been used in a “constant pattern” and was “always set off” in some way).
190 Id. (citations omitted).
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owner’s use was too sporadic and lacked a “consistent” pattern of use.191 According to
the court, the putative owner had not consistently placed INTELLIGENCE
EVERYWHERE on “a particular part of the page, or in a particular type, or labeled it
with [the superscript] ‘TM,’ or consistently used a distinctive font, color, typeset or
any other method” that warranted trademark protection.192 As such, a designation
will typically not be protected under trademark law if it has not been used
consistently.193
One exception to this general principle is the “family of marks” rule. The
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals defines a family of marks as,
a group of marks having a recognizable common characteristic, wherein the
marks are composed and used in such a way that the public associates not
only the individual marks, but the common characteristic of the family,
with the trademark owner. Simply using a series of similar marks does not
of itself establish the existence of a family. There must be a recognition
among the purchasing public that the common characteristic is indicative of
a common origin of the goods.194
Under this rule, the McDonald’s corporation, for example, has come to own a
number of marks, both related and unrelated to food, distinguished by the “Mc”
formative, “including McDONUT for doughnuts, McPIZZA for a pizza product, and
McMUFFIN, McCHICKEN and McRIB for sandwich-type products.”195 Returning to
the variation prong, the “family of marks” rule is one clear example of conscious
adaptation of a trademark.
The MGM lion’s roar is less clearly part of a family of marks, but still variable
enough to be a meme. Though the lion’s roar has been used since 1924, the literal
intonations and number of roars have been changed and enhanced over time.196
What is more, MGM has used variations of the lion’s roar in specific films. For
example, in the 1935 film A Night at the Opera, it is Groucho Marx, and not a lion,
who roars in the opening trailer.197 In certain Tom and Jerry theatrical features
from the 1960s, it is Tom the cat who hisses and meows during the opening.198 The
Id. at 341–44.
Id. at 342.
193 This is not to say that trademarks cannot be periodically upgraded or revamped. See Long,
supra note 21, at 133. The appearance of a trademark “can be updated to take advantage of popular
trends or new imaging methods, generally without a loss of rights.” Id. (describing how Prudential
Insurance Company’s Rock of Gibraltar logo, which first appeared in 1896, has gone from a
“generally idealized but accurate depiction” to “merely an abstract design of the outline of a rock”).
194 J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
that McDonald’s possesses a family of marks where the prefix “Mc” is used with generic food names).
195 Id. at 1461.
196 See Ed Vigdor, MGM Logo History and the 2008 Restoration Process, COATES NOTES BLOG,
http://garycoates.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/logo-history-restoration-article.pdf (last visited Aug.
31, 2013).
197 See Sean Beard, et al., Logo Variations:
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, CLG WIKI
http://www.closinglogos.com/page/Logo+Variations+-+Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer+Pictures (last visited ,
2013).
198 Id.
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lion’s roar, therefore, has also experienced owner-created variations over the years
that justify its identification as a meme.
Finally, selection provides that some memes, and/or their mutations, have “a
replicatory advantage within a given environment.”199 Certain memes are passed on
to other people quickly and go viral, while others do not get copied at all.200 This
condition points to the crux of trademark development: to identify and distinguish
one company’s goods from competitors in such a way that deepens buyer loyalty and
ultimately increases market share.201 Trademark owners use a number of methods
to achieve brand loyalty over their competitors, including market testing,
advertising, maintaining product quality, ensuring longstanding use, and appealing
to consumer characteristics.202 Because trademarks are ultimately a practical way of
connecting with individual consumers, scholars have noted that they are “powerful
forces” even when unwarranted.203 “[S]trong . . . loyalty results in a measurable price
premium that consumers are willing to pay for the brand,” regardless of how similar,
or in some instances how much lower, the quality is as compared to competing
items.204 McDonald’s, for example, has some of the most popular trademarks and
brands around the globe,205 even though the quality of its food offerings is a
subjective determination.
This reality certainly provides the trademark
McDONALD’S with a replicatory advantage.
Using the aforementioned analysis, trademarks can operate as selfish
replicators and therefore fit within Dawkins’s original vision of the meme.206
Trademark law appears to be premised on doctrines similar to the natural selection
process, at least in some respects. The strongest trademarks are those that have
garnered customer loyalty through their association with quality products, the
emotional attachments of consumers to the goods, and years of use, marketing and
advertising.207
Strong memes, like trademarks, have the highest levels of
memorability and infectiousness.208 Those that also have the most interactions
between hosts will prevail.209

Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 337.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
201 See Long, supra note 21, at 128–29, 134.
202 Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 402, 402 n.25, 416; Long supra note 21, at 135 (discussing
consumer loyalty).
203 See, Long, supra note 21, at 135.
204 Id.
205 See Quality Inns Int’l. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Md. 1988) (noting
that “over 95 percent of the entire American population has eaten at a McDonald’s, and eight
percent of the entire work force in the United States once worked at a McDonald's restaurant” and
that “[t]he recognition of Ronald McDonald by children between the ages of two and eight is 100
percent, a figure matched only by Santa Claus”).
206 See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text; see generally DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE,
supra note 28, at 189–201.
207 See generally, Long, supra note 21, at 125–26.
208 See DENNETT, supra note 28, at 344 (referring to memes as “distinct memorable units”)
(emphasis omitted).
209 Kevin N. Laland & John Odling-Smee, The Evolution of the Meme, in DARWINIZING
CULTURE, supra note 28, at 134.
199
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The comparison between trademarks and memes, however, is incomplete
because all three requirements may not be equal. The Dawkins three-pronged
analysis requires a balance between replication, variation, and selection in
appropriate amounts, otherwise evolution by natural selection is impossible.210
Whether individual trademarks can strike the appropriate balance is not always
clear.211 The next Part outlines the factors impacting this balance with respect to
trademark memes.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT AND NATURAL SELECTION
Certain facets of the law impact how trademarks evolve through natural
selection. Trademark enforcement delivers the main impact, particularly with
respect to families of marks and famous trademarks. The most common way
trademark owners enforce their trademark rights is through lawsuits for
infringement and/or dilution. If enforcement mechanisms create too many biases in
meme transmission or too much mutation, then perhaps such a balance cannot be
struck. Individuals fearful of a trademark lawsuit may not imitate a trademark that
memetic theory otherwise supports.
A. Trademark Infringement and Memes
The basic test for trademark infringement is whether the marks are so similar
that consumers are likely to be confused.212 In this vein, a trademark owner can only
enforce its trademark rights against use on a product that would “reasonably be
thought by [consumers] to come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated
with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner.”213 Federal courts have
developed a factor-based test that determines likelihood of confusion.214
The traditional infringement analysis will impact memetic replication only when
it “changes the selective environment to the detriment of competing memes, or in
See DAWKINS, SELFISH GENE, supra note 28, at 193–94.
See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 353 (discussing question of balance with respect to
copyright). Determining this balance may depend upon the “Watson and Crick” moment that has
yet to happen.
212 See MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 23:1. This is true under common law, state law and
federal law. Id.
213 Id. § 24:6; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 680 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding infringement possible where purchasing public “could conclude that [the defendant’s]
products and services are affiliated or associated with [the trademark owner’s]”).
214 Compare Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961), with AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir.
1979). The test is not identical in all of the federal circuits, but most of the analyses include some
semblance of the following factors: the strength of plaintiff’s mark, the degree of similarity between
the infringed mark and the allegedly infringing mark, the proximity of the products in the
marketplace, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the
defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the
sophistication of the buyers. See, e.g., Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
210
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some way renders competing memes defenseless.”215 In most instances, however,
infringement does not significantly impact memetic replication. There are three
reasons for this. First, in most cases a trademark owner can only preclude another
from using the same or a similar trademark on goods.216 For example, if a trademark
owner uses the name TRADEWINDS for its coffee pots, it cannot preclude a software
company from using the name TRADEWINDS for its virus protection software.
Second, use as a trademark is required in most instances.217 The earlier-mentioned
coffee pot manufacturer, therefore, cannot keep an unrelated coffee company from
advertising that “our new individualized, flavored coffee packets work great with
TRADEWINDS coffee pots” because the coffee company is not using the term
TRADEWINDS as a trademark to identify itself. Third, one commonly used factor in
determining a likelihood of confusion is the similarity of the marks.218 This factor
could be seen as encouraging memetic mutations, in the sense that infringement is
unlikely to be found where the marks have visible differences. Essentially, therefore,
TRADEWINDS on coffee pots is generally only enforceable against others who use
TRADEWINDS on coffee pots. This principle leaves the selective environment
unchanged. The TRADEWINDS meme for coffee pots still remains, regardless of the
source, and TRADEWINDS can still be used for unrelated goods or services.
One exception to this would be the expansion of trademark infringement
jurisprudence through the family of marks concept. As noted elsewhere in this
Article, McDonald’s has successfully been able to control non-food uses of the prefix
“Mc.”219 In addition, a family of “R” US suffix marks was found to exist in Geoffrey
Inc.’s use of marks TOYS “R” US and KIDS “R” US.220 In this manner, trademark
owners can capitalize on the societal prominence of their marks and expand the
enforceable reach of these marks.221 As a result, the justifications that formerly
Cotter, supra note 25, at 382.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916).
established principle of trademark law, the Supreme Court noted that:
215
216

Explaining this well-

[i]f [a person] does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and
stamps a lion on his linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron; but when he
has appropriated a mark to a particular species of goods, and caused his goods to
circulate with this mark upon them, the court has said that no one shall be at
liberty to defraud that man by using that mark, and passing off goods of his
manufacture as being the goods of the owner of that mark.
Id. (quotation omitted).
217 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contexualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599, 1636 (2007). Few non-trademark uses will infringe.
Id. (“To be sure, trademark uses are more likely to infringe; they still represent the paradigmatic
infringement case. Likewise, non-trademark uses are on balance more likely to be justified or nonactionable in any number of ways because they are less likely to implicate the core concerns of
trademark law.”).
218 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
“Beanie Babies” and “Beanie Racers” marks were similar and confusingly similar).
219 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
220 See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1696 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that
defendant’s use of PHONES-R-US for telephones infringed Geoffrey, Inc.’s family of “R” US marks).
221 See Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 398.
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limited the scope of trademark infringement by goods identification have lost quite a
bit of their original impact.222 This expansion modifies the natural selection
environment because competing memes on unrelated goods are essentially powerless
to compete with a family of marks.223
B. Trademark Dilution and Memes
A related expansion problem is trademark dilution, where a trademark owner
may enforce its rights in a trademark that is legally characterized as “famous.”224
Federal dilution claims were not created until 1995 and were considerably revised by
the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”).225 Dilution grants
protection to famous trademarks if a defendant’s use will “diminish or dilute the
strong identification value of the plaintiff’s mark” even if there is no likelihood of
confusion.226 Upon a showing of fame, the trademark owner must next prove dilution
by either blurring or tarnishment.227 Blurring occurs when consumers see the
plaintiff’s famous mark on various other goods and “the ability of the famous mark to
clearly identify and distinguish only one source might be ‘diluted’ or weakened.”228
Tarnishment, on the other hand, occurs where a defendant’s use damages “positive
[consumer] associations of the mark and . . . harm[s] the reputation of the mark.”229
Since its creation, courts and commentators have expressed their displeasure
with dilution doctrine, which is seen as a “fundamental shift” away from basic
trademark concepts.230
In addition, the fame requirement has been nearly
Id.
See Cotter, Prolegomenon, supra note 25, at 783 n.26. These could be considered strong
memeplexes, wherein the generic phrases or weak memes attach to the strong memes. Id.
224 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). The theory was first introduced by Frank Schechter in the
1920s and 1930s through writings and congressional testimony. Frank I. Schecter, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 830–31 (1927). Dilution has been widely
criticized by many as based on outdated rationales. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in
Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469,
506 (2007) (stating that “there is no convincing normative account of why trademark law should
protect against dilution. . . . [T]he original arguments for protecting against dilution were based on
beliefs and modes of justification that are no longer compelling today. Schechter's pragmatic
approach, so congenial to early twentieth century legal realists, does not persuade modern
trademark scholars.”).
225 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
226 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 24:72.
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
228 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 24:69. Well-known dilution by blurring examples include
DUPONT used for shoes, BUICK used for aspirin, and KODAK used for pianos. Id.
229 MCCARTHY, supra note 157, § 24:70. A quintessential example of tarnishment is a poster
with ENJOY COCAINE in red and white Spenserian script, identical to the COCA-COLA symbol
used on products and advertisements. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that “[Coca-Cola’s] good will and business reputation are likely to suffer in
the eyes of those who, believing it responsible for defendant’s poster, will refuse to deal with a
company which would seek commercial advantage by treating a dangerous drug in such jocular
fashion”).
230 See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1029–30 (2006). Some argue that
dilution law is “producer-focused rather than consumer-focused,” while others claim that it “is
222
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impossible to explain or define with any degree of consistency.231 The TDRA allows
for the consideration of:
[A]ll relevant factors, including the following:
(i)

The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark . . . [;]

(ii)

The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark[;]

(iii)

The extent of actual recognition of the mark[; and]

(iv)

Whether the mark was registered . . . on the principal register [with
the Trademark Office].232

Because courts have not applied these factors with any degree of uniformity,233
irreconcilable trademark precedent is a strong barrier for memetic evolution.
Because trademark law confers the greatest benefits to those with famous
trademarks, famous trademark holders are vigilant in their enforcement efforts.
This can impact a meme’s selective environment and make competing memes
powerless to replicate effectively.
Under the TDRA, courts have held that
AMERICA’S TEAM for the Dallas Cowboys is famous and was diluted by a
trademark registration for AMERICA’S TEAM for t-shirts,234 and that THE OTHER
WHITE MEAT, a slogan promoting the consumption of pork, is famous and was
likely to be diluted by THE OTHER RED MEAT for salmon.235 Viewing these
dilutive trademarks as memes, such rulings limit their ability to replicate, either
perfectly or by mutation. Because of rampant inconsistencies, it is difficult to know
when an adopted trademark might dilute another. The threat of litigation will deter
geared toward protecting consumers because diminution of a famous mark’s ability to identify a
product increases consumers’ search costs.” Id. at 1034–35. This uncertainty is part of the danger
of dilution theory, which is designed to apply only under rare circumstances. Id. at 1042–43; Port,
supra note 15, at 874–82 (describing dilution law in general and its unpredictability).
231 Port, supra note 15, at 880–81. There does not exist a uniform standard for fame, but at
least one scholar has advocated for a standard requiring “concrete proof of national fame through a
proper consumer survey evidencing at least seventy percent of the general consuming public across
the United States.” Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 122–23 (2011).
232 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
233 See Nguyen, supra note 231, at 104–10 (discussing how courts have struggled with the
question of fame, applying old legal standards that are no longer the law, ignoring the law, or
unsuccessfully attempting to apply the law).
234 Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.’s Team Prop., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 646
(N.D. Tex. 2009).
235 Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1498 (T.T.A.B.
2010). On the other hand, COACH, a trademark for high-end handbags and leather goods was held
not famous. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600, 1611–12 (T.T.A.B.
2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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business owners from adopting marks that are too similar to the putative famous
marks and necessarily preclude the replication of those memes. Broad trademark
protection under a dilution theory, therefore, can impede the replication and natural
selection process of new memes.
One additional observation is that trademark dilution is designed to apply only
in very rare instances. Even if famousness precludes natural selection in these
limited instances, many other trademarks that can still benefit from an analysis
couched in memetic theory. Included in that number are society-driven words and
phrases that happen to go viral before anyone can appropriate trademark rights in
those designations. The next Part outlines this phenomenon and proposes one
approach for addressing them.
IV. TOWARD A PRAGMATIC APPROACH FOR SOCIETY-DRIVEN TRADEMARKS
While the USPTO does not keep statistics on society-driven trademark
applications that arise after the corresponding words or phrases appear in a viral
news story, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the number of individuals
seeking protection for such marks has increased over time.236 While these were
originally called “‘meme mark’ filings,” by Professor Beebe,237 this classification is
incomplete because, as we have seen, nearly any trademark can be a meme. The key
is the rate of replication. Indeed, memes that begin as poor replicators may avoid
death as long as they continue to reside in some medium waiting for resuscitation.238
To account for the replicatory advantage, this article adopts the phrase “viral meme
mark” applications. The word “viral” takes into consideration the rapidity with
which some trademarks replicate in various environments.239 The next section
outlines the rise of viral meme mark applications filed in the USPTO and the
significance of such filings for American trademark law.
A. The Rise of Viral Meme Mark Applications in the USPTO
Viral meme mark applications arise after the corresponding words or
catchphrases appear as part of a popular media event.240 These applications are
nearly always based on alleged future use of the mark in commerce, as opposed to
actual use. The USPTO has a bifurcated registration process for domestic trademark
applications: Section 1(a) applications are based on prior, actual use of the

See Newcomb, supra note 6.
Beebe, supra note 24, at 757.
238 See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 353.
239 See 2 HOSSEIN BIDGOLI, THE HANDBOOK OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT: SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT, MARKETING AND ADVERTISING, AND GLOBAL MANAGEMENT 442 (2010) (noting that
the term “viral” is used with respect to marketing because information spreads “like a ‘virus’
throughout each customer’s social network,” bringing news of the product and service to a wide
range of people).
240 See Newcomb, supra note 6.
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designation as a trademark in commerce,241 while Section 1(b) based applications
permit an applicant to start the registration process by merely claiming a bona fide
intent to use the designation as a trademark at some point in the future.242 Upon
receipt of an application, a Trademark Examiner at the USPTO assesses it to make
sure all registration requirements have been met.243 If the application meets the
requirements, then “[n]o trademark . . . shall be refused registration” unless
statutorily prohibited.244 It is, therefore, the USPTO’s burden to prove that a mark
should not be registered. Though trademark rights arise through use, and not
registration,245 one benefit of filing a federal trademark application is that it provides
nationwide priority in the mark in connection with the goods identified in the
application, even if the trademark owner has not yet done business nationwide.246
There are two common bases of rejection relevant to viral meme mark
applications. First, the USPTO will reject trademark applications that “falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols.”247 Second, the USPTO has the power to refuse registration based on
widespread use. Under this rationale, “[t]he more commonly a phrase is used, the
less likely that the public will use it to identify only one source and the less likely
that it will be recognized by purchasers as a trademark.”248 These prohibitions have
not, however, been consistently effective. The next section provides and fully
describes examples of viral meme mark applications and the seemingly disparate
results in the USPTO.
1. LET’S ROLL
On September 11, 2001, United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked as part of a
terrorist attack on the United States.249 One passenger, Todd Beamer, tried to place
a call to his home through a telephone located on the plane but was routed to Lisa
Jefferson, a phone supervisor.250 After praying with Jefferson, Beamer told her that
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2012).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). Even in this instance, an actual trademark registration will not
issue until the applicant proves actual use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d); Cohen, supra note 161, at 693.
243 Beebe, supra note 24, at 758.
244 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
245 See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 904 (C.C.P.A.
1969) (“It is our understanding of the Lanham Act that it is for the registration, not the creation, of
trademarks. Its terminology—indeed, the history of federal trademark statutes—presupposes the
pre-existence of a trademark to be registered.”).
246 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(c).
247 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
248 In re Eagle Crest Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1227, 1229 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (citing Reed v. Amoco Oil
Co., 611 F. Supp. 9, 11 (M.D. Tenn. 1984)). The USPTO has used this rationale as one basis for
rejecting a trademark application for OCCUPY WALL STREET. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/454,550 (filed on Oct. 24,
2011), FINAL REFUSAL (May 23, 2013).
249 See ANTHONY SUMMERS & ROBYN SWAN, THE ELEVENTH DAY: THE FULL STORY OF 9/11 AND
OSAMA BIN LADEN 58–65 (2012).
250 Id. at 60.
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he and some other passengers were going “to jump the guy with the bomb.”251 Next,
Jefferson heard the sounds of an “awful commotion.”252 Then, “are you guys ready?”
and Beamer yelling, “let’s roll!”—a phrase that he had often used to spur his children
to action.253 The phrase became popular immediately after the details of Flight 93
were made public, and it garnered further attention after President George W. Bush
stated his January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address that “America [had]
embrac[ed] a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let’s roll.’”254 Less than five months after
the phrase was used onboard United Airlines Flight 93, fourteen entities and
individuals had applied to trademark the phrase,255 including the Todd M. Beamer
Memorial Foundation, Inc.,256 co-founded by Beamer’s wife. The foundation’s
application, which was filed on September 26, 2001, was initially successful in the
USPTO, and the phrase was subsequently licensed to Wal-Mart and others.257 Of the
fourteen applications in the initial wave of filings, none are currently trademarks.258
2. SHOCK AND AWE
Shock and awe is a military doctrine popularized in 1996 by Harlan K. Ullman
and James P. Wade, Jr., and it is based on the use of massive and overwhelming
force, “Rapid Dominance,” and other displays of force during wartime.259 When
President Bush announced the decision to invade Iraq on March 19, 2003, the Bush
Administration announced that it would employ a shock and awe strategy to defeat
the Iraqi military and Saddam Hussein.260 Within a month, the USPTO received

Id.
Id. at 61.
253 Id.
254 President Delivers State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2002, 9:15 P.M.),
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
255 Michael Okwu, Flight 93 Charity Seeks ‘Let’s Roll’ Trademark, CNN (Feb. 2, 2002, 11:10
AM),
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-02-02/us/beamer.trademark_1_todd-m-beamer-foundationtrademark-lisa-beamer. Interestingly, the first person to file a trademark application was Jack L.
Williams, a person unrelated to Todd Beamer, whose application encompassed LET’S ROLL for
goods and services related to apparel, namely t-shirts and sweatshirts. Id. When asked about his
application and its impact on the Beamer family, he stated that, “I don’t care what your name is, it’s
first in, first swim . . . . It’s all about good old American capitalism.” Id.
256 U.S. Trademark No. 2,691,610 (filed Feb. 25, 2003) (LET’S ROLL).
257 See Matthew Diebel et al., Iconic Figures from Sept. 11: Where Are They Now?, MSNBC
(Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44245075/ns/us_news-9_11_ten_years_later/t/iconicfigures-sept-where-are-they-now/#.UHI_bhhERdo.
258 See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (click “Basic Word Mark Search,” enter “Let’s
Roll” as search term, select “The Exact Search Phrase” from “Result Must Contain” dropdown box,
and click “Submit Query”).
259 NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE 333 (2008); see also HARLAN K. ULLMAN ET AL., SHOCK
AND AWE: ACHIEVING RAPID DOMINANCE 19–36 (1996).
260 See MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, COBRA II: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 35–37 (2006).
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numerous applications for trademarks using the phrase “shock and awe.”261 A
fireworks company filed the first trademark application on March 20, 2003, the day
the United States began bombing Baghdad.262 Sony Corporation filed the second
trademark application on March 21, 2003, for use as the title of a video game.263
Sony later withdrew the mark amid intense criticism, describing the application as
“an exercise of regrettable bad judgment.”264 Today, most of the “Shock and Awe”
applications have been abandoned.265
3. SEAL TEAM 6
The United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group is the Navy’s very
secretive special operations force and the Naval component to United States Special
Operations Command.266
Various SEAL teams operate under the group’s
umbrella.267 The most well known team is SEAL Team 6, which killed Osama bin
Laden on May 2, 2011, in a “raid that ended a decade-long manhunt.”268 Eight
trademark applications were filed in the four weeks following Osama bin Laden’s
death (seven were for SEAL TEAM 6, and one was for SEAL TEAM RAIDER 6).269
Disney Enterprises filed three of those applications less than twenty-four hours after
bin Laden’s death.270 After a public outcry,271 and public statements issued by the
261 Sabra Chartrand, Patents; Before Shock and Awe Can Go from Battlefield to Lunchbox,
There is a Stop at the Trademark Office, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/04/21/business/patents-before-shock-awe-can-go-battlefield-lunch-box-there-stoptrademark.html (noting applications for products including fireworks and “Shock and Awe Sauce”).
262 U.S. Trademark No. 2,861,120 (filed Mar. 20, 2003) (SHOCK AND AWE). The application
ultimately was accepted and registered as a trademark on July 6, 2004. Id.
263 U.S. Trademark Application No. 78/228478 (filed Mar. 21, 2003) (SHOCK & AWE); see also
Julian Day, Sony to Cash in on Iraq with “Shock and Awe” Game, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2003),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2003/apr/10/games.Iraqandthemedia.
264 Statement Concerning a Trademark Filing in US by [Sony’s] Game Affiliate, SONY (Apr. 15,
2003), http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/ServiceArea/030415/index.html.
265 See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), USPTO, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2013) (click “Basic Word Mark Search,” enter “Shock and Awe” as search term,
select “The Exact Search Phrase” from “Result Must Contain” dropdown box, and click “Submit
Query”).
266 Michael P. Murphy, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/
moh/mpmurphy/pr.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
267 Id. The acronym is derived from their capacity to operate at sea, in the air, and on land. Id.
268 See Ashley Fantz, Navy SEALs, the ‘Quiet Professionals,’ Got bin Laden, CNN (May 3, 2011,
8:53 P.M.), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/03/binladen.seals/index.html.
269 See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), USPTO, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last
visited July 21, 2013) (click “Basic Word Mark Search,” enter “Seal Team 6” as search term, select
“The Exact Search Phrase” from “Result Must Contain” dropdown box, and click “Submit Query”).
270 See U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,310,970 (filed May. 3, 2011) (noting use in
entertainment and education services); U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,310,966 (filed May 3,
2011) (noting use with toys, sporting goods, electronic games, and Christmas decorations); U.S.
Trademark Application No. 85,310,957 (filed May 3, 2011) (noting use with clothing, footwear, and
headwear).
271 Disney found itself being criticized in various mediums, including comedy television. Jon
Stewart famously quipped, “putting a trademark on SEAL Team 6 is like copyrighting the guys who
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U.S. Navy,272 Disney expressly abandoned its two applications “out of deference to
the Navy.”273 All of the other applications were also abandoned either through
express declarations or failure to respond to certain USPTO requests.274
4. TRAYVON MARTIN
After the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman on February
26, 2012, in Sanford, Florida, public reaction quickly transformed from a passive
simmer to a rapid boil as many people raised questions of racial profiling, vigilante
justice and inequality.275 The story went viral soon after the national media began
covering it on March 8, 2012.276 Nearly simultaneously, the phrases I AM TRAYVON
and JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON appeared as rallying cries on thousands of Facebook
pages, as Twitter hashtags, and in the titles of YouTube videos. In addition, T-shirts,
sweatshirts and other merchandise with the same phrases became a staple on street
corners in Sanford and commonplace at many of the nationwide demonstrations held
to express support for Martin and his family.277 Roughly three weeks after her son’s
death, Martin’s mother, Sybrina Fulton, filed two trademark applications for the
phrases I AM TRAYVON278 and JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON.279
Three other
stormed the beaches of Normandy, or the Statue of Liberty, or putting a patent on [George S.]
Patton . . . . It belongs to all of us!” Jon Stewart, The Daily Show (Comedy Central television
broadcast, May 16, 2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-may-16-2011/well-that-was-fast---comcast-nbc-merger.
272 Ethan Smith & Julian E. Barnes, Walt Disney Surrenders to Navy’s SEAL Team 6, WALL
ST. J. (May 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304066504576345752703
592770.html (quoting chief Navy spokesman Commander Danny Hernandez as saying, “We are fully
committed to protecting our trademark rights” in response to Disney’s applications).
273 Id.
274 See TESS search results, supra note 269.
275 Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a Program That Seeks
to
Avoid
Guns,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
23,
2012,
at
A12,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlights-neighborhood-watchgroups.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
276 See Brian Stelter, In Florida Shooting Case, a Circuitous Route to National Attention, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/business/media/formartins-case-a-long-route-to-national-attention.html.
After the story was broadcast by local
affiliates on the night of the shooting, the first national reports came on March 8, 2012, from CBS
News, The Huffington Post and NBC News website The Grio. Id. By the end of the week, CNN,
Headline News, and other black radio hosts and bloggers also covered the story. Id. According to
the Pew Research Center, the controversy over Martin’s shooting was the American public’s top
story for at least five straight weeks following the first days of coverage. See Pew Research Ctr. for
the People & the Press, News about Trayvon Martin Case Still Top Story (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/04-24-2012%20NII%20final.pdf.
277 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 275; Richard Fausset, Trayvon Martin T-shirts: American
Outrage, Size XXL, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/nation/la-nann-trayvon-t-shirt-roundup-20120402 (“The Trayvon Martin protest T-shirt has become a staple at
rallies across the country . . . . [Some t-shirts] . . . simply proclaim, ‘I am Trayvon.’”).
278 U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,575,974 (filed Mar. 21, 2012) (I AM TRAYON).
279 U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,575,890 (filed Mar. 21, 2012) (JUSTICE FOR
TRAYVON).
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individuals (unconnected to Martin or his family) filed five additional applications
employing Martin’s name.280 Fulton, in particular, was sharply criticized by some as
attempting to profit from her son’s death and stifling activities designed to spread
the broader messages related to racial profiling, vigilantism and inequality.281 Both
applications have been published for opposition; if no one opposes the applications
within a certain period of time, they will proceed to the final steps of the registration
phase.282
B. Memetic Framework for Federal Protection
As illustrated above, the USPTO has allowed a number of viral meme mark
applications to issue as trademark registrations.283
Such protection confers
nationwide priority in the viral meme mark for the goods outlined in the application
once the applicant proves actual use. Though this should not, in most instances,
result in the wholesale preclusion of uses unrelated to the goods or services, this is
not always the case. For example, though LET’S ROLL was registered for charitable
fundraising services, the Todd M. Beamer Memorial Foundation negotiated a license
with Florida State University to receive shares of the profits from t-shirts sold
bearing the phrase.284 In addition, within days of the applications for I AM
TRAYVON and JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON for digital materials and digital media,
personalized products like t-shirts, sweatshirts, and the like bearing Martin’s name

280 See U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,578,962 (filed Mar. 23, 2012) (JUSTICE 4
TRAYVON); U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,596,507 (filed Apr. 12, 2012) (I AM NOT
TRAYVON MARTIN); U.S. Trademark Application No. 85,581,109 (filed Mar. 27, 2012) (IF I HAD A
SON, HE’D LOOK LIKE TRAYVON).
281 See Why is Trayvon Martin’s Mother Trademarking His Name?, THE WEEK (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/226172/why-is-trayvon-martins-mother-trademarking-his-name;
Elie Mystal & Christopher Danzig, Trayvon Trademark? An ATL Debate, ABOVETHELAW.COM (Mar.
29, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/03/trayvon-trademark-an-atl-debate; Lisa M. Ruth,
Trayvon Martin:
the Marketing of the Victim, WASH. TIMES CMTYS. (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/life-lisa/2012/mar/30/trayvon-martinmarketing-victim/.
282 See supra notes 278–279 (indicating publication for opposition).
283 See supra Part IV.A. Additionally, though the number of resulting registrations may seem
low in some cases, this could be attributed to abandonment and is not an affirmative assessment of
applications by the USPTO. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.III (discussing Disney’s abandonment of
SEAL TEAM 6 marks). Viral meme mark applications are sometimes abandoned because the
applicants fail to timely respond to requests by the USPTO. See id.
284 Sue
Chan, The Marketing of “Let’s Roll,” CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/11/september11/main521521.shtml (noting that “[t]he
Beamer Foundation agreed it is a tribute, and is now getting a share of the profits from ‘Let's Roll’
gear sold in Florida State colors”). The football coach, Bobby Bowden, had adopted “Let’s Roll” as
the team’s slogan as a tribute to those who died on September 11, 2001. Id.
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disappeared from major Internet retailers.285 What is more, the potential for overenforcement of trademarks is high for viral meme marks.286
Considering such applications in terms of memetic theory, the precise
evolutionary effect of protection and enforcement (or over-enforcement) of
trademarks rights is difficult to forecast.287 If, however, we recognize that trademark
law can positively or negatively influence memetic natural selection, we can assess
the potential impact of broadening trademark protection. For example, if dilution
theory accords broad protection beyond any particular goods or services to certain
trademarks, arguments can be made that such an extension decreases replication of
the strongest memes and can negatively impact natural evolution.288 Governing
authorities can begin to weigh the public policy concerns, and potential benefits and
costs, of implementing trademark policies that can inhibit or support societal and
cultural development. The USPTO could consider natural memetic predilections in
assessing trademark applications, perhaps by temporally limiting when such
applications can be filed.
CONCLUSION
Acknowledging that memetic theory may play a role in the popularity and
growth of trademarks could be a critical step in evaluating the direction of trademark
law. Admittedly, there are difficulties and unanswered questions. This Article
explores a few of these questions, including the ultimate permanency of memetic
theory, whether or not trademarks can function as memes, and the impact of current
enforcement mechanisms on natural selection and evolution.289 This Article posits
that memetic theory can be helpful in determining what replicatory advantages exist
between various trademarks (or memes) and also how trademark enforcement and
the broadening of trademark protection can threaten the cultural evolution of such
marks. In allowing nationwide appropriation of culture-driven words and phrases, it
is desirable to clearly delineate and enforce boundaries when putative owners seek
federal registration. Many questions remain, and a different perspective that
considers memetic theory calls for a reassessment of current trademark standards.

285 See, e.g., Dylan Stableford, What Happened to All of the Trayvon Martin Hoodies on Cafe
Press?, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/sideshow/happened-trayvonmartin-hoodies-cafe-press-144936770.html.
286 See Leah C. Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 641 (2011)
(discussing “trademark bullies” outside of the memetic context); K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark
Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of
Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 631 (2004).
287 See Cotter, Memes, supra note 25, at 401 (noting that, with respect to copyright law,
“[s]pecific evolutionary impacts are impossible to predict, and even likely evolutionary
directions . . . can only be assessed in a probabilistic fashion”).
288 A similar argument could also be made with respect to the “family of marks” doctrine.
289 Issues still remain. For example, do viral meme marks develop “good tricks,” as earlier
posited? Are these marks smaller components of larger memeplexes? Is it possible to adopt
“famous” marks and subsequently register them with the USPTO? Though these analyses are
beyond the narrow scope of this Article, I plan to address such questions in later work.

